منبع خبر : حمیدرضا ذاکری کارمند اسبق سازمان اطلاعات ایران
قاضی نیسمان که هم‌اینک کشته شده، مشکوک بود که رئیس جمهوری آرژانتین با امضای توافق با ایران، خواسته در برابر فروش خواربار به تهران، از دولت جمهوری اسلامی امتیاز هفت میلیارد دلاری در زمینه انرژی بگیرد و از نفت ایران برخوردار شود و ابعاد این معامله و سود شخصی زیر میزی آن بالغ بر 40% برای طرفین بوده .
آلبرتو نیسمان، قاضی ارشد دادستانی آرژانتین که ده سال مامور تحقیق در مورد بمبگذاری ۲۱ سال پیش در کانون یهودیان این کشور بود، یکشنبه گذشته در آپارتمانش کشته شد.
آرژانتین تایید میکند که قاضی نیسمان به قتل رسیده‌است.ولی کماکان این موضع در پرده ای از ابهام بسر می برد.
ماموران تحقیق در مورد قتل نیسمان در روزهای گذشته خبر داده بودند آثار باروت به‌روی دست و انگشتان نیسمان مشاهده نشده است؛ امری که نشان می‌دهد فرد دیگری گلوله را به مغز نیسمان شلیک کرده‌است.
رسانه‌های آرژانتین خبر داده‌اند که شماری از نیروهای پلیس و اطلاعاتی این کشور در ارتباط با قتل نیسمان مورد بازجویی قرار گرفته‌اند.
رسانه‌های آرژانتین این ماموران را «نیروهای خودسر» نامیده‌اند.
آنیبال فرناندز، رئیس کارکنان دفتر ریاست جمهوری شنبه چهارم بهمن به رویترز گفت، مأموران اطلاعاتی که از کار خود اخراج شده‌اند، قاضی نیسمان را با اطلاعات اشتباه «گمراه» کردند.
دولتمردان آرژانتین در دفاع از رئیس جمهوری کشورشان می‌گویند، نیروهای اطلاعاتی که نیسمان گزارش خود علیه رئیس جمهوری را با استناد به آنها نوشته‌است، منافع خاص خود را داشته و اخراج شده بودند.
اما نیسمان در گزارش علیه رئیس جمهوری کشورش نوشته بود، این نیروهای اطلاعاتی مدتی طولانی مکالمات و تماس‌های رئیس جمهوری و وزیر خارجه او با نمایندگان ایران را ردگیری کرده و برای این اخراج شدند.
کریستینا فرناندز کرشنر، رئیس جمهوری آرژانتین، با تایید قتل نیسمان، مدعی شده‌است «توطئه‌ای بزرگ علیه او و دولتش برنامه‌ریزی شده‌است».
آلبرتو نیسمان کمتر از چهار روز پس از اعلام خبر تنظیم کیفرخواست علیه خانم فرناندز کرشنر که در آن کرشنر به تبانی با جمهوری اسلامی ایران متهم شده‌است، کشته شد.
جسد نیسمان ساعاتی قبل از آن به‌دست آمد که قرار بود او با حضور در یک نشست محرمانه کنگره آرژانتین علیه رئیس جمهوری کشورش ادای شهادت دهد.
پنجشنبه گذشته کیفرخواستی که نیسمان تهیه کرده و آن را نزد یک قاضی دیگر گذاشته بود، منتشر شد.
کیفرخواست ۲۸۹ صفحه‌ای تهیه شده از سوی قاضی نیسمان، مدعی است، خانم کرشنر و دولتمردان او، مانند هکتور تیمرمن، وزیر امور خارجه، از دو سال پیش در تبانی با دولت ایران، موافقت کردند نقش مقامات ارشد وقت ایران در بمبگذاری ۲۰ سال پیش در کانون یهودیان آرژانتین را پوشانده و پرونده همچنان لوث‌شده بماند.
نام هشت نفر از مقامات وقت ایران در مظان اتهام دخالت دراین بمبگذاری مطرح است.
در بمبگذاری تابستان ۱۹۹۴ میلادی ۸۵ نفر کشته، بیش از سیصد تن زخمی و ساختمان هفت طبقه یهودیان منهدم شد. انفجار ساختمان «آمیا» دو سال پس از انفجار در سفارت اسرائیل در بوئنوس آیرس رخ داد.
اینترپل، پلیس بین‌الملل، برای علی فلاحیان، وزیر وقت اطلاعات ایران، محسن ربانی، رایزن فرهنگی ایران در سال ۱۹۹۴ در آرژانتین، محسن رضایی، فرمانده وقت سپاه پاسداران ایران، احمد وحیدی، فرمانده وقت شاخه قدس سپاه، احمد رضا اصغری، دبیرسوم وقت سفارت ایران و هچنین برای عماد مغنیه افسر ارشد اطلاعاتی حزب الله حکم جلب بین‌المللی صادر کرد؛ مغنیه در سال ۲۰۰۸ در سوریه کشته شد.
اینترپل درخواست سال ۲۰۰۷ آرژانتین را برای صدور حکم جلب علیه اکبر هاشمی رفسنجانی، رئیس جمهوری و علی اکبر ولایتی، وزیر خارجه وقت ایران، مسکوت گذاشته بود.
در این میان، رسانه‌های آرژانتین پنجشنبه گذشته خبر دادند، رد پاها و اثر انگشتانی بدست آمده که به آپارتمان همجوار نیسمان رسیده‌است.
براساس گزارش رسانه‌های آرژانتین، یک فرد خارجی ساکن این آپارتمان همجوار بوده‌است.
جزئیات بیشتری در باره این فرد خارجی منتشر نشده است؛ اما بنظر می‌رسد احتمال ارتباط او و اجاره کردن این آپارتمان در همجواری آپارتمان نیسمان در طبقه سیزدهم یک برج مسکونی در بوئنوس آیرس در حال بررسی است.
قتل نیسمان مردم آرژانتین را بهت زده کرده و یهودیان این کشور نیز با تظاهراتی خواهان جلوگیری از لوث شدن بیشتر پرونده انفجار «آمیا» شده‌اند.
اصل گزارش دادستان نیسمان به زبان انگلیسی
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AMIA CASE: ARGENTINIAN PROSECUTOR ALBERTO NISMAN ACCUSED
THE IRANIAN REGIME, AND MOHSEN RABBANI IN PARTICULAR, OF
INFILTRATING LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES, BUILDING LOCAL
CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE STATIONS DESIGNED TO SPONSOR,
FOSTER AND EXECUTE TERRORIST ATTACKS, WITHIN THE
PRINCIPLES TO EXPORT THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION.
Introduction
For the first time in the argentine and world judicial history, it has been
gathered and substantiated in a judicial file, evidence that proved the steps taken by a
terrorist regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, to infiltrate, for decades, large regions of
Latin America, through the establishment of clandestine intelligence stations and
operative agents which are used to execute terrorist attacks when the Iranian regime
decides so, both directly or through its proxy, the terrorist organization Hezbollah.
These actions have been taking place within the so-called “export of the revolution”,
which was never masked by Tehran and is, in fact, written in their own constitution.
Throughout a lengthy and very strong indictment of more than 500 pages,
released today, the General Prosecutor of the AMIA case, Alberto Nisman, based in
countless reports, evidence, testimonies, court and investigative records related to other
countries of the region, North America and Europe and rulings of foreign courts against
the Iranian regime, was able to corroborate and strengthen with new evidence, the
responsibility of the Iranian regime in the AMIA bombing, stressing –in particular- the
higher degree of responsibility that Mohsen Rabbani and Samuel Salman El Reda had in
the attack, taking into account that both have international arrest warrants and red
notices from Interpol. Also, the Prosecutor proved the way in which the fundamentalist
terrorism sponsored and financed by Iran operates and hides in Latin America, its
networks and operational system.
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This intelligence and terrorist network had already caused devastating
consequences in Argentina in 1994 and almost strike again in the United States in 2007,
when the blowing of fuel pipes and tanks of “John F. Kennedy” New York´s
International Airport was dodged by the timely intervention of US law enforcements
agencies, which –in this case- led to the arrest of the plotters and their conviction to life
imprisonment. Several of those terrorist were veteran Iranian intelligence agents that
were active in the region. Among them was Guyanese citizen Abdul Kadir, whose
importance lays in his close relationship and hierarchical subordination to Mohsen
Rabbani.
Throughout the investigation have emerged strong traces of identical
situations, this is to say, the establishment of intelligence bases and centers with clear
operative capability to execute terrorist attacks, which could be replicating in several
Central and South American countries and – according to what has been proved by the
prosecution - represented and still does -no more and no less- the expression of a radical
Iranian policy which has persisted unaltered for years and entails the dual use of
diplomatic representations and cultural, religious and charity associations, in order to
conceal illegal activities and objectives behind their legitimacy.
Such discoveries entitled Mr. Nisman, in compliance with judicial assistance and
international cooperation agreements and also with counterterrorism and human rights
treaties ratified by the Argentinian State, to send copies of this indictment to the
pertinent judicial authorities of Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana,
Trinidad & Tobago and Suriname, since several pieces of evidence suggested that
certain aspects of the Iranian criminal plan could be taking place within their territories.
Also, a copy will be sent to the USA authorities within the Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty signed between both countries.
This new evidence incorporated to this investigation clearly shows that the
AMIA bombing –beyond the motivations explained in Mr. Nisman´s indictment of
2006, that is, the disruption in the supply of nuclear material to the Islamic Republic of
Iran- took place while Latin America was being strongly and aggressively infiltrated by
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Iran. In other words, the AMIA bombing did not constitute an isolated event and –
therefore- it must not be conceived as a single picture. It has to be investigated and
understood as a segment in a larger sequence, a part of a bigger image, where the
terrorist attack that took place in Argentina, although dramatically relevant, constitutes a
piece that requires a deeper knowledge of its context to be properly understood and
unraveled. These conclusions are linked to the words of the First Commander of the
Revolutionary Guards Corps, Javad Mansouri: “Our revolution can only be exported
with grenades and explosives”.
It was demonstrated that in 1982 an important seminar was held in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, attended by approximately 380 religious men from 70
different countries. This meeting was a turning point on the regime’s method to export
the revolution, understood as the cultural, political and religious infiltration promoted to
expand a radical and violent vision of Islam. In the seminar, it was concluded that the
regime would use violence and terrorism to reach its expansionist objectives. And that is
why Javad Mansouri called to turn each Iranian embassy into an intelligence center and
a base to export the revolution.
This had special influence in what Mohsen Rabbani describes as an
unexplored land with plenty of possibilities for the Iranian regime, in obvious reference
to Latin America. As a consequence of what have been decided in the 1982 seminar,
many relevant appointments were made the following year. In 1984 the mullah
Mohammad Tabataei Einaki was sent to Brazil, from where he was expelled because of
his involvement and links with the terrorist organization Hezbollah. In 1983, the Islamic
Republic of Iran accepted Abdul Kadir as its agent in Guyana, who ended up convicted
for the terrorist conspiracy to attack New York´s Airport. And also in 1983 the regime
sent Mohsen Rabbani to settle in Argentina who, many years later, ended up seriously
involved in the AMIA bombing.
Despite the Iranian involvement in the terrorist conspiracy to attack the
New York airport, the crucial issue in this matter –based on the documents seized and
shared with this investigation by the US judicial authorities- is the remarkable
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resemblance in the building and development of the intelligence and infiltration
structures established in Argentina and Guyana since 1983, according to Tehran’s
guidelines. That is to say, there is a distinctive feature within the terrorist pattern created
by the Ayatollah’s regime, which is characterized by the dual use of diplomatic offices,
cultural or charity associations and even mosques, as it was forewarned by the United
Nations itself in General Assembly Resolution n° 51/210 (1996).
The intelligent and infiltration station fostered and financed by the Iranian
regime had an important role in the AMIA bombing and, in this new indictment, it has
been investigated, analyzed in its full dimension and documented with the most solid
evidence.
This intelligence structure presented itself segmented in links: the embassy
fulfilled its protocol and consular functions; mosques were in charge of religious
activities and the local Muslim community received all these joint efforts. However, a
deeply and more detailed scrutiny revealed the illegal side of this very same structure,
which remained hidden under the legitimacy of the activities referred before. So,
embassies fulfilled a protection function by providing legal coverage and diplomatic
immunity, they were ideal information exchange channels and also monitored eventual
reactions of the local government. Mosques were used by the Iranian local leaders as
recruitment centers, in search of people with alike radical ideas. Under these guidelines
Mohsen Rabbani used the Embassy, the Cultural Attaché’ Office, many people who
attended “At Tauhid”, “Al Iman” (Cañuelas) and “El Martir” (San Miguel de Tucumán)
Mosques, the “front companies” such as Imanco and GTC, and indoctrinated local
followers with his fundamentalist ideas, in order to make them functional to the
regime´s objectives.
Besides revealing the characteristics of the Iranian infiltration method, in
the AMIA file there are copies of foreign judicial rulings from cases investigated and
judged in Germany, France, Switzerland, among others, which jointly with the
conclusions of this new indictment, had allowed to document recurrent similar actions
of infiltration, violence and terrorism in different countries and regions, which
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constitute nothing else but the expression and materialization of an Iranian regime´s
policy that has remained unaltered for years.
From the assessment of the evidence gathered and detailed in this
indictment have emerged strong traces that in several Central and South American
countries, such as Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad &
Tobago and Suriname, activities alike those which were undertaken in our country
before the 1994´s attack could be carried out in those states, even with different degrees
of development. These considerations have prompted the General Prosecutor in the
AMIA case, in compliance with international commitments assumed by Argentina in
matters of judicial assistance, international cooperation, counterterrorism and human
rights, to send copies of this indictment to the pertinent judicial authorities of those
countries.
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Summary
Delving deeper into the investigation and the measures aimed towards the
capture of the AMIA Case’s fugitives, it was detected, in July 2010, the existence of a
criminal case before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York (Brooklyn), in which several defendants were being prosecuted for conspiring to
commit a terrorist attack against the John F. Kennedy airport. The information pointed
out that one of them, Abdul Kadir, had repeated contacts with Mohsen Rabbani,
principal architect of the local connection in the AMIA bombing with an international
arrest warrant and red notice by Interpol.
This circumstance immediately motivated the Prosecution Investigation
Unit of the AMIA case to contact the US judicial authorities in order to start an
information exchange to obtain evidence linked to the person and activities of Mohsen
Rabbani. Mainly, the deepening of this investigative line had the purpose to establish
the knowledge Abdul Kadir and his acquaintances could have had about the terrorist
bombing to the AMIA Center and Rabbani´s involvement in it, especially considering
that, from the beginning of this new inquiry, it was known that the contacts between
Rabbani and Kadir were contemporary to the July 18th blast.
Although initially it was examined the possibility of any kind of
involvement of Abdul Kadir himself and his acquaintances in the AMIA bombing, that
hypothesis had not been supported by any evidence collected until now, which therefore
entitled this office to produce certain investigative measures, given the proven relations
between Kadir and Rabbani.
Along this line, besides the testimonies taken by the Prosecutor´s Office
under the Argentina–United States Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, this Unit also
received copies of substantial documents seized by the Guyanese Law Enforcement
Agencies in the searches conducted in Kadir´s residence as well as those obtained by the
Trinidadian authorities when he was arrested. In those searches, as it was corroborated
while taking testimony to the FBI agent Robert Addonizio, there were seized, among
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other important documents, letters addressed to Mohsen Rabbani, newspapers articles
that mention At Tauhid mosque -formerly run by Mohsen Rabbani- and a Kadir’s
personal phone book with Rabbani’s contact information handwritten in it.
From the beginning it is worth mention that the study of circumstances
and the context in which this conspiracy took place, revealed common patterns between
the activities performed by Kadir in Guyana and those developed by Rabbani in
Argentina. It became evident that in the Caribbean nation had been settled the same
Iranian intelligence infiltration system as it was in Argentina, consisting of many stages,
interactive and complex links, for example: the arrival of Iranian Mullahs with a
radicalized vision, propaganda and ideological infiltration according to that vision,
recruiting and training of local Muslims and new converts, funding, dual use of
mosques, cultural centers and Iranian diplomacy, etc. The characteristics identified in
Guyana are similar to those that have already been detected in our country and were
widely detailed and explained in the October 25th 2006 indictment. Despite the fact that
Guyana and Argentina are two far distant and extremely different countries, the building
and development of both Iranian intelligence stations showed remarkable resemblance,
resulting in the need to deepen even more the investigation to further the study of the
context in which AMIA bombing occurred.
This new evidence, jointly analyzed with the probing elements that were
already part of this investigation, showed that this intelligence structures had a single
and unique leadership, which allows to conclude that they had been preconceived, that
means, they were not the result of the free will of the local leaders– Rabbani and Kadir
– who were means that executed a previously shaped idea. The origins and unique
features that characterized these structures allowed associating them inescapably with
the Islamic Republic of Iran.
So, it is possible to state that the Iranian Intelligence structures discovered
in Argentina as well as in Guyana – which were suitable to provide essential support for
the deadly terrorist attack of 1994 and the dangerous conspiracy of 2007- were not only
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very similar in its components, ways of implementation and purpose, but they were also
conceived within the framework of the policy for exporting the revolution.
The Prosecution Unit was able to demonstrate that the seminar held in
Teheran in 1982 on the subject of the ideal Islamic government, which was attended by
approximately 380 religious men from 70 countries, was a turning point on the regime’s
policy for exporting the revolution which included, since then, the use of violence and
terrorism when necessary. In other words, that seminar meant for the Iranian leadership
the birth of a justification for the use of violence as an admitted and even promoted way
for removing the obstacles that could be found in spreading their radical vision. That
was stated, among others, by the First Commander of Revolutionary Guard Corps,
Javad Mansouri, who declared: “Our Revolution can only be exported by grenades and
explosives”, and subsequently summoned each Iranian Embassy to turn into an
intelligence center and a base to export the Revolution.
The prosecutor explained the backgrounds that made the seminar possible,
noting that in October 1980 it was created the Organization of Islamic Liberation
Movements (OILM) which started to operate as the real machinery for exporting the
revolution. Its leader, Mehdi Hashemi, was appointed Commander of a special unit
within the Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran) and from that position he started
organizing a structure which contained warfare guerrilla units, initially including
Saddam Hussein´s Iraqi dissidents who, at that time, were refuges in Iran. In a short
period, the OILM reached a spectacular development becoming the leader in exporting
the Islamic Revolution. Since the beginning of OILM’s activities, a department called
“Studies and Investigations Unit” was exclusively devoted to analyze foreign situations
so as to export the Revolution.
After the 1982 seminar it became clear that, in order to achieve its
expansionist objectives, the Iranian regime considered the possibility of using violence
and terrorism if necessary. Those guidelines were put into practice by establishing
intelligence and espionage structures in third countries with the sufficient capability to
provide support for terrorist operations.
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The expansionist ambitions of the regime became evident in one of the
statements of the Iranian leader Ali Larijani, Minister of Culture during Rafsanjani´s
government, former President of the Iranian Parliament, appointed negotiator by the
Supreme Leader Khamenei to deal with western countries in the nuclear topic, member
of the National Security Superior Council and one of the most well-known academic of
the Islamic nation. He said: “Why do I think that we should not restrict ourselves to our
territory? Because, in this world, we do not represent only an Islamic power but also we
are on the Supreme Leader’s land– both in Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei´s
times. Until this responsibility is acknowledged by the Muslim world, this last one will
be obliged to submit to her [Supreme Leader’s Land]. And until our land is that of the
Supreme Leader of Islam, we will be responsible for the whole Muslim nation”.
Theory led to practice. Few months after the seminar, the Islamic Republic
of Iran sent Mohsen Rabbani to settle in Argentina (whose activities ended up with his
involvement in the AMIA bombing); accepted Abdul Kadir as its agent in Guyana
(which turned out to be involved in the conspiracy to attack JFK airport); and sent
Mohammad Tabatabaei Einaki to Brazil, from where he was expelled because of his
involvement in political activities incompatible with the role he had declared to
perform.
An specific example that the Iranian activities in South America dated
back to those days, is a report sent to Iran by Rabbani from Argentina, which stated:
“According to our Islamic point of view, Latin America is for us and the international
world, a virgin area, that unfortunately, till now, its huge potential has not been taken
into account by the Islamic people of Iran. (…) we have a solid support against the
imperialism and Zionism intrigues, being an important aid in favor of our presence in
the area”.
It’s clear that since his arrival to Argentina, Rabbani was the spokesman
of the hardest line inside the Iranian Regime. The economic capacity that he showed
during his years in Argentina; the control and dual use of Shiite mosques in this
country; the administration of communication media dedicated to Islamic culture; the
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authority over a group of loyalists to the project (“antennas”) and the support that he
received from the Iranian diplomacy in Argentina; were the pillars that, without any
doubt, allowed this radical leader to build an intelligence structure according to the
strategy conceived by the Islamic Republic of Iran and take advantage of its resources in
case the instructions of the “export of the revolution” demanded extreme methods, as it
occurred in our country. In that way, the Iranian expansionist program gained foothold
in Argentina.
In this sense must be understood the Iranian infiltration in Guyana and
other Caribbean countries, due to the labor of one of Rabbani’s disciple: Abdul Kadir,
former Mayor of Linden and former national congressman. This intelligence agent,
trained and supported by Iran, established in his country an intelligence structure,
strikingly similar to the one built by Rabbani in Buenos Aires, which served the
regime’s interests. His work constituted a fundamental support to another act of
international terrorism: the conspiracy to attack JFK airport in New York, for which
Kadir was convicted to life imprisonment.
In this indictment it was proven that Abdul Kadir had covered a similar
route to the one treaded by Mohsen Rabbani in our country. It was established that in
1983, due to some initial contacts, Kadir managed to travel to the Islamic Republic of
Iran, with the declared purpose of making himself available for the requirements of the
Islamic revolution. According to the evidence, at his return from Iran, Kadir became the
regime’s referent in his home country. Then a process of political and religious
settlement began, in which the building of the necessary bases for exporting the Islamic
Revolution was the essential objective. At this point, it is worth to mention the
relationship he started with Morteza Tavasoli, back in those days Iranian ambassador in
Venezuela and Kadir’s first regional contact, who assisted him in the propagation of the
fundamentalist vision emanated from Iran.
Kadir was already working for Iran and, at that time, his relationship with
the regime was conducted through the Iranian Ambassador in Venezuela. It is worth to
say Guyana did not have an Iranian diplomatic representation within its borders.
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Attached to the file there are intelligence reports that Kadir addressed to Tavasoli in
which he explained political, economic and social developments of Guyana, he made
references of the characteristics of the Guyanese Armed Forces as well as the security
agencies and, basically, he detailed the correlating forces within the Guyanese and
neighboring countries’ Muslim community.
Other evidence showed that since the 90´s there was a direct relationship
between Rabbani and Kadir in which the second was subordinated. That dependency
reflected the trust that Rabbani, as the Iranian regional leader for exporting the
revolution in Latin America, had in Kadir, showing the real interest of Iran in improving
the Islamic radicalized movement in this region.
So, this agent responsible of spreading extremism in Guyana and in
neighboring countries, recruited individuals who shared the regime’s ideology and used
the religious propagation to cover illegal activities, for example by preparing several
intelligence reports and elaborating a “Five Year Development Plan”, in which he
conceived the infiltration of Guyanese armed, police and special security forces,
governmental agencies, the obtaining of multiple citizenships and document´s forgery,
devising the indispensable ways and means to facilitate the establishment of an
intelligent station with the characteristics promoted by Teheran.
Moreover, through the “Islamic Information Center of Guyana”, which he
founded and directed, and from his position as representative of the Secretariat of the
Islamic Caribbean Movement, he was able to spread his preaches from Guyana to other
nations, such as Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda,
Suriname and Grenada. This became evident in the statement of Steven Francis –
confidential informant infiltrated in Kadir’s terrorist cell, who registered many
conversations of the plotters-, when he testified that Kadir and his acquaintances: “(…)
were on the path to revolution; they were creating an organization; they were seeking to
emulate Hezbollah. They wanted to form an organization like Hezbollah in the
Caribbean, with its ideology. Kadir´s ideological level was very high, very convinced,
he had studied a lot.(…) They wanted to extend throughout the continent. They could
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resort to violent methods if it were necessary to achieve their objective. Their ideology
was violent, they were going to establish themselves by any means, even by force.”
So, in the indictment is demonstrated the way in which the Islamic
Republic of Iran, throughout the years, made significant improvement in the training
and in the ideological, logistical and financial support provided to Kadir which allowed
him to proceed, in the way he actually did, that is, becoming involved in a plot to carry
out a terrorist attack of a huge and unpredictable magnitude.
In sum, the radical ideas inspired by the Iranian leaders ended up shaping
a terrorist with ideal conditions to achieve their violent objectives and to carry out a
terrorist attack like the one planned against the JFK airport which, as the US prosecutors
stated, could have been similar or even worse than the 9/11 Twin Towers attack.
In this presentation it has also been explained how, early in 2007, Kadir
was contacted to be part of the conspiracy to attack the JFK airport of New York City
and that his contribution to draft the final plan was extremely valuable. As an example
of this, it is worth mention his recommendations about the quantity and type of
explosives that should be used in the attack (it must be noted that he was a civil
engineer with a long career and experience in the mining industry) and his approval to
use the bank account that he used to raise funds for building a mosque in Guyana, so as
to hide the incoming money for the terrorist plot. This last example shows, once again,
the way in which the Iranian agents operate by concealing illegal actions under religious
activities, in this specific case connected to a terrorist plot.
In this petition, it has also been proved that the Iranian authorities not only
had been informed of the plan to attack “John F. Kennedy” Airport, but they appear to
be seriously involved in this operation, which entails a greater implication. A proof of
this, among other evidence, is the statement of Steven Francis who declared that Abdul
Kadir has explicitly referred that his contacts in Iran and in the Iranian Embassy of
Venezuela said that they were already developing their own plan to attack New York’s
Airport, but –eventually- it was decided to pursue Russell Defreitas’ plan. Concretely,
he said that “there were people already looking into this activity and to the attack of
13
JFK….there were people looking already into this matter but it was not to the extent of
the knowledge displayed by Sheik Muhammed”, that is, Defreitas. It is clear enough to
say that Russell Defreita’s plan was considered a better plan compared to the one
already in sight of Iran, which also would explain Kadir’s sudden departure to Iran to
finalize details of the attack.
Regarding Kadir, he was arrested precisely while being on his way to the
Islamic Republic of Iran, where he was going to finalize details of their criminal plan.
That is the reason why Salim, one of Kadir´s sons, had communicated with his contacts
in Iran to obtain assistance for his arrested father.
Iran’s involvement was necessary because its revolutionary leadership was
going to provide the financial support and the fatwa, that is, the religious order that
authorized the attack. Francis explains in his testimony, the plotters’ need to obtain the
ruling from a religious leader who must order the execution of the terrorist act.
This need explains why the plotters had decided to send a trusted person to
Iran in order to meet with the leaders of the Iranian revolutionary movement and, thus,
further the terrorist plan. In the trial of another plotter, Kareem Ibrahiim, US Attorney’s
Office –Eastern District of New York- pointed out that the conspirators had agreed to
“contact the person with the highest rank inside Iran’s revolutionary movement”. In
addition, the person sent to Iran would travel pretending to be in a pilgrimage to Mecca;
this is to say, it was agreed that in order to send an envoy to Iran to further the terrorist
plan, it was convenient to include that person in the Hajj or Umrah pilgrimages, as a
way to avoid scrutiny or suspicions from international security agencies or authorities.
This is the reason why the group created the code “Hajj or Umrah travel”.
Those facts were confirmed by Kareem Ibrahiim himself who, in his
testimony before court, stated that when they made references about sending Salim to
Umrah, actually it was a code they created to refer to his journey to Iran in order to
further their terrorist plan. Moreover, in the conversations registered by the F.B.I. there
are references about the idea to hide the trip to Iran under a pretense pilgrimage to
Mecca.
14
Finally, it must be stated that from Defreitas’ point of view, Kadir was
very important to the plot, not only because he was a successful leader, but also due to
his deeply rooted connections with Iran and its embassy in Venezuela. This assessment
was accurate because, as it has been analyzed by the Prosecutor, the introduction of
Kadir to the plot not only meant the inclusion of a man, but also of a complete logistic,
operative and economic structure controlled by Iran, with the specific capacity to
facilitate and successfully execute a terrorist attack.
Therefore, the dual use of cultural and religious activities was present in
the conspiracy to attack the JFK airport. As an example of this, it can be mentioned the
pretense of a pilgrimage to Mecca to cover the real intention to travel to Iran to pitch the
terrorist plot; secondly, the use of a bank account opened to collect funds for the
building of a mosque in order to conceal the financing of a terrorist act. A third
example, is revealed by the decision to use the funds collected for charity by voluntary
donations of Muslims, with the purpose of financing the passport expenses of the person
sent to Iran to pitch the terrorist plot. Moreover, Kadir had developed a “five year plan”
which included both the need to create programs of madrazas as well as the infiltration
of security forces and document’s forgery. Finally, it must be mentioned that the
conspirators of the attack the JFK airport used the mosque of Guyana as suitable place
for exchanging information related to the plan.
The detailed analysis of Kadir’s activities in Guyana and in the Caribbean
under Iranian directions showed the way in which the Islamic Republic of Iran had
spread its strategy of cultural, religious and ideological infiltration in our region. It is
not a coincidence that in two countries with utterly dissimilar idiosyncrasies, like
Argentina and Guyana, the routes covered by both Iranian agents (Rabbani and Kadir)
had been almost identical. Thus, there is a correspondence in the beginning of their
activities, the financing and indoctrination provided by the Iranian regime, the
indivisible fusion between politics and religion, an intense activity aimed to recruit and
train supporters of their fundamentalist vision, the preparation and submission of
intelligence reports and the dual use of mosques, cultural centers and embassies in order
15
to establish an intelligence station, avoiding to arouse suspicion within local law
enforcement authorities.
Such coincidences can only be explained due to their common origin, that
is, the exporting of the revolution policy that, under a religious and cultural cover,
foresees the infiltration of third countries. Since the 1982 seminary, this infiltration was
materialized in an intelligence structure that, under the cover of cultural and religious
promotion and diplomatic and/or commercial activities, would be able to provide
operative and logistical support to terrorist actions, if necessary. That is what precisely
happened in Argentina in 1994 and in Guyana in 2007.
Dual use of institutions related to the Iranian regime
The cultural and religious coverage to hide illegal actions turned to be a
milestone of the infiltration strategy developed by Teheran. Precisely, the investigation
of this case uncovered the use of legal activities, as for example the cultural and
religious diffusion and commercial and diplomatic activities, as a cover for intelligence
tasks and, mainly, it evidenced the fact that this duality paved the way for the
establishment of Iranian espionage structures that, if necessary, are able to facilitate and
support terrorist acts. In sum, during the course of the investigation it was possible to
collect different probing elements that showed a methodology which consist in the use
of legitimate activities to hide criminal objectives and actions.
This methodology was not limited to South America. Thus, in the former
Federal Republic of Germany, Kazem Darabi, who occupied a similar position to the
one hold by Sheik Rabbani in Argentina, had also been implicated in criminal activities,
when he participated in the murder of four Iranian dissidents committed in September,
1992, in Berlin by order of the then Islamic Republic of Iran government (known as
“Mykonos case”).
16
This has been highlighted by the Higher Regional Court of Berlin, who
affirmed in its ruling: “Under the veil of a religious activity, he made contact with his
fundamentalist fellows of Lebanese origin and verified their ideas and levels of trust.
These qualities allowed Darabi, both personally and logistically, to organize the attack
against the representatives of the DPK-I in Berlin, with such a detail that the act could
be executed with the support of other forces from Iran, with a high level of success
probability and with the lowest risk of being discovered”.
Not less important is the fact that Kazem Darabi, who took advantage of
his religious position to connect the different participants of the “Mykonos case”, was
arrested by the German police and convicted to life imprisonment by the judiciary of
that country. This constituted a true lesson for the Iranian authorities who had ordered
the assassination of their opponents. So, for the AMIA bombing, they decided
deliberately and with premeditation to protect from justice their agent in Argentina, by
granting Mohsen Rabbani diplomatic immunity designating him Cultural Attaché of the
Iranian Embassy, four months before the attack.
In this same line should be read the dual use of Islamic centers, as it has
been exposed by the French judiciary, regarding the murder of the former Iranian Prime
Minister Chapour Bakthiar, when affirmed: “Jaffar JALALI arrives to France in 1980
as a student; he rapidly calls the attention for his political-religious fanaticism. In 1981
he becomes an employee of the Iranian Embassy in Paris (…). In 1983, as Political
Commissar at the Embassy, he actively participated of the Khomeinist propaganda from
the Iranian Cultural Center in Paris (…) and exercised an “intense information
activity” about the movements leaded by Chapour Bakthiar”.
This matter can be perfectly noticed, once again, in the “Mykonos case”,
not only for the categorical statements of the pronouncement but especially for the
authority that rules the matter, the Higher Regional Court of Berlin. While studying
Kazem Darabi’s activities – identified as the “local connection” of that terrorist act -,
the Berlin’s Court detected this duality by declaring that the Islamic Center of Berlin
“functions, in a similar way as the Islamic Center of Hamburg, for the diffusion of the
17
Islamic thought in the sense of an authoritarian “State-God” and for the recollection of
intelligence information…”.-
Hans Vorbeck, Government Director of the former Federal Republic of
Germany and expert in the terrorism, when asked about the investigation of the
“Mykonos case”, revealed that the Islamic centers, mosques and businesses of its
followers were the meeting points of Hezbollah members.
In addition, Bernard Millerat, then Chief of the Middle East Department of
the “Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire” (DST), Ministry of Home Affairs,
informed, on September 3rd 1997, that his department detected Iranian intelligence
elements in the Islamic Center of Paris, when assessing the patterns of the different
crimes in which it had been proved the participation of Islamic fundamentalist
extremists.
The same duality, but in reference to mosques, has been publicly
proclaimed by one of the top leaders of the Iranian Revolution, the Ayatollah
Montazeri, who stated that mosques should not only be centers of praying but also
centers of cultural, political and military activity. In fact, Mohsen Rabbani, in charge of
the “At Tauhid” mosque of Buenos Aires, used this institution to spread
fundamentalism. Even, one of his acquaintances, without being an expert in
international security affairs or having any particular study on Islamic religion, was able
to notice the Iranian agents double game and therefore he mentioned that Rabbani’s
religious activity was a “mask”.
Furthermore, the qualified witness Abolghasem Mesbahi said: “Regarding
the transfer of information, religious ceremonies or cultural meetings are generally
used in order to hand over a telephone number, for example”.
Embassies follow this same pattern. Former Iranian President, Abolhassan
Bani Sadr, declared: “In the countries where Iran conducts terrorist operations, most of
the embassies members are Iranian intelligence service agents, VEVAK, or from the
Revolutionary Guards”.
18
Also, the testimonies of the Iranian dissidents Ahmad Reza Ahmadi and
Hamid Reza Eshagi, stated that the Iranian Ministry of Information relies directly on the
embassies; that most of the first and second Secretaries are agents of the Ministry of
Information and that they change their names at the moment of being designated, hence,
their real identities are not the one declared in their passports.
Jean Louis Bruguière, former Paris Judge, competent in terrorism, pointed
out: “In each Iranian embassy there are members of the VEVAK, some of them officially
and others, clandestinely”.
Furthermore, Roland Chatelain - Swiss Judge who investigated the murder
of the Iranian dissident Kazem Radjavi – stated: “There is a clear coordination between
the Quds Force leaded by Vahidi, the Minister of Intelligence and Security leaded by
Fallahijan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ambassadors”. He explained the
structure as follows: “The Quds Force was in charge of the terrorist operations, the
embassy provided the logistics and the Ministry of Intelligence distributed the
information collected after the reconnaissance missions”.
Precisely, this interaction between different Iranian agencies was
highlighted by the Great Britain Parliamentary Human Rights Group in its report of
June 1996 when asserted that: “The planning and execution of terrorists bombings are
not, as it has been suggested, a separate activity of Iranian groups but it is an activity
coordinated from the Intelligence Department, which operates in the Iranian regime
president’s office. This department has been created and leaded by Rafsanjani when he
was elected president (…) determines who will be the selected assassination target”. In
another part of their report, they stressed that if the plan is assigned to the Al Quds
Force, its leader programs a meeting to plan the details of the operation, and then the
results are sent again to the intelligence department, from where a note is sent to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs describing the level of collaboration they will need,
including passports, visas and budget. The Iranian Embassy of the chosen country is
informed and the operative groups contact certain persons within the embassy who are
in charge of receiving the message.
19
In words of Matthew Levitt: “Iran definitely sees the use of violence and
terrorism as a legitimate means of furthering its foreign policy objectives”.
Without intending to conclude the matter, it will be quoted the former
Iranian Ministry of Education, Manouchehr Ganji, who clearly stated that “the Islamic
Revolution has constantly maintained that they would carry out terrorists operations
abroad, it was never a secret”.
All these assertions made by courts, judges, experts and former Iranian
leaders about the dual use of religion, culture and Iranian diplomacy to cover
intelligence operations and even for planning terrorist bombings, though they are
concluding, are not new, since the United Nations (UN) had already warned about the
dual use of institutions when, in the resolution 51/210 of December 17th, 1996 noted the
improper use of “organizations, groups or associations, including those with charitable,
social or cultural goals, by terrorists who use them as a cover for their own activities”.
At this point it should be stressed that not every cultural or religious
diffusion, every diplomatic activities and/or social and educative promotion are meant
to cover terrorism. Such an absurd conclusion could damage legitimate and valuable
activities, threatening essential liberties of the actual law system. Attention must be paid
only when the legitimacy of such activities is used to conceal illegal acts that can
potentially end up in intelligence operations or any form of terrorism.
The prosecutor made clear that his office has always been aware of the
importance of religious issues, indicating that the conclusions arrived in all of his
indictments have nothing to do neither with the Islamic faith nor with people who
professes that religion. These pronouncements only intended to point out both the
criminal responsibilities of specific individuals and the improper use of legitimate
institutions that have been related, one way or another, to the radical and extremist
vision of the Iranian regime.
In sum, the reiterated and similar behavior of Iranian agents verified in
different parts of the world, evidenced common patterns of action, which excluded any
isolated consideration. So, it is the manifestation of a policy that has remained unaltered
20
for years, characterized by the activities of religious leaders in third countries -
supported by embassies, mosques and cultural centers – whose goals are to infiltrate the
local community and build an intelligence station with capability to facilitate and
support terrorist acts that the Iranian regime eventually decides to perpetrate.
Qom schools
The proselytism developed by Iranian extremists aimed at the recruitment
and/or conversion of individuals to their principles. Its final goal is to coopt those who
are easily influenced by the regimen’s interests, so they can be functional to perform
activities required by the intelligence station. This has been stated by Abolghasem
Mesbahi: “The religious activity of the Mullahs consists in doing infiltration work in the
local communities, surveillance of dissidents and recruitment of people that will be used
in the future and who may even kill in the name of religion”.
Thus, Rabbani distorted his role of religious educator in order to transmit
extremists’ ideas to the students who attended his classes. This has been proved by the
statements made by a witness who asserted: “… during the year 1990, three students
told him that Rabbani had explained to them that they should export the Revolution and
told them ‘everybody is Hezbollah’ (…) Rabbani made these statements to his students
as part of the indoctrination imparted during their study. The witness added that
Rabbani carried out this indoctrination with all the students that attended the mosque.
The meaning of the expression ‘everybody is Hezbollah’ was used by Rabbani as a way
to make the students understand the violent meaning he granted to the export of the
Revolution”.
This same duality was replicated in Guyana, as it has been indicated by the
agent Addonizio: “… in the Islamic centers that he [Abdul Kadir] directed, propaganda
about Islam was made and they tried to convert people so that they would join the Shia
movement in Guyana. In that search, persons of adequate profile were sought after, that
21
is to say, that had the necessary level of commitment to be sent to Iran to complete
religious instruction…”.
The indoctrination itself does not only consist in the study of Islam in the
students’ home countries but also its continuance in the city of Qom, for which the
candidates have to be sponsored and also approved a rigorous selection in which it is
examined their religious knowledge and mainly, their commitment to the principles of
the Islamic Revolution. It is interesting to mention a concrete example whose main
characters are precisely, Rabbani and Kadir. In a letter dated March 20th 1999, Kadir
answered Rabbani about the “mission” that the last one had entrusted him. He had to
assess the aptitudes and commitment of certain members of the local Muslim
community.
Therefore, it should be noted that the indoctrination imparted at Qom,
Iran, is a key aspect of the export of the Revolution. When characterizing these schools,
Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary, Saeed Jalili, expressed: “Qom and
the seminars are Iran’s arsenal in the area of soft warfare”. Attention must be paid to
the fact that he openly admits that the seminars in Qom are used to cultivate the
ideological loyalty of thousands of Shiites and, thus, to continue sustaining the
principles of 1979 Revolution. Moreover, Mehdi Khalaji, former student at Qom and
Shiite theologian, explained that “the seminar became the ideological arsenal of the
revolutionary regime”. In addition, it should be considered the publication made by
Farzad Razi in 2006, of a list of the terrorist training centers in Iran, which included
Beit-Ol-Moqaddas University of Qom.
The active presence of the Iranian intelligence office in the schools of
Qom was observed by the then Colombia´s National Director of Intelligence, Lieutenant
Colonel Luis Gilberto Ramirez Calle, who explained: “As it has been established, the
MOIS usually uses the scholarships [for students] as a way to take potential agents to
Iran in order to recruit and train them”.
22
So, what starts as a cultural and religious instruction, in certain cases, ends
up in the training of extremist fighters, who may be involved in terrorist operations.
Assad Hussein Berro, suicide bomber who crushed a truck full of explosives against a
convoy of Israelis soldiers in southern Lebanon in August 8th 1989, was religious and
ideologically formed in Qom. The Tunisian Fouad Ali Saleh, convicted for the terrorist
attacks in Paris in 1985 and 1986, was a student of religion in Qom; and Mohsen
Rabbani, who was in charge of the local logistics in the AMIA bombing, is a professor
at Qom.
Therefore, it is not odd that the terrorist organization Hezbollah Secretary
General, Hassan Nasrallah, had been a student at Qom and gave, at least, one speech in
the mentioned schools. It should be reminded that this person declared: “there are a
thousand suicide commandos ready to strike Israel all over the world”.
The close ties between Hezbollah and Iran does no longer need to be
clarified. It has been openly admitted by Nasrallah himself when in February, 2012
stated: “Since 1982, we received moral, political and material support in all possible
means from the Islamic Republic of Iran… In the past, we have only talked about the
moral and political backing, without mentioning that they had also helped us militarily,
to avoid embarrassing Iran. But today, we decided to speak out”.
Once again, the prosecutor makes a clarification in order to avoid any
misunderstanding regarding this indictment. The office is not censuring in any way, and
it would not be able to do so, the religious instruction that thousands of well-intended
students received in the Qom´s seminars. Objectively, it was remarked the common
background that many terrorists shared by having studied Islamic religion in that city,
along with the recruitment that the Quds Forces carried out within students,
manipulating their religious passion and severely harming the reputation of those
schools. Hassan Nasrallah, Mohsen Rabbani, Assad Berro, Fouad Saleh and many other
more are a clear example of what it has been stated here.
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Intelligence Stations
The dual use of institutions controlled by the Iranian Regime, the cultural,
religious and propagation activities conducted by its agents abroad and the radical
indoctrination of its supporters, have its ultimate result in the construction of
intelligence stations with the capability to provide logistic, economic and operative
support to terrorist attacks decided by the Islamic regime, everything under the
publicized action of exporting the revolution.
This presentation studies the above mentioned intelligence structures.
According to a first analysis of the Prosecution Unit, the intelligence structure settled by
the Iranian regime in Buenos Aires was segmented in links, which were characterized
by the following main features: the Embassy fulfilled its protocol and consular
functions; mosques in charge of the religious activities and the local community
received all these joint efforts. A deeper and more detailed scrutiny revealed a different
aspect of the structure: illegal activities were covered by the legitimacy of the ones
abovementioned. Therefore, embassies performed a shield function, by providing its
authorities with a legal coverage and diplomatic immunity. As well, they functioned as
ideal channels of information exchange and, also, they monitored eventual reactions of
the local government. Mosques were used as bases for recruitment, in search of people
with alike radical ideas. Under these lines, Rabbani used the Embassy, the cultural
Attaché’s Office, the people who attended At Tahuid, Al Imam (Cañuelas) and El
Martir (San Miguel de Tucuman) Mosques, the “front companies” such as GTC and
Imanco and he radicalized locals who might end up being functional to the Regime’s
interests.
The innovative contribution of this new indictment lays in the fact that the
intelligence station detected in Argentina back in those days was also established in
Guyana by the Iranian Regime and, furthermore, those who built these espionage
structures –Rabbani and Kadir- were closely related. Consequently, it was concluded
that the intellectual author of these structures is the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
24
created them mainly to gain operative and logistics capabilities to resort to violence,
when necessary, in order to remove obstacles that might interfere in the spreading of its
objectives.
Here lays the intrinsically dangerous and evil of the situation, derived
from the possibility of infiltrating a country and installing an intelligence station under
the veil of legitimate activities and without arousing suspicions. As it was stated before,
at a certain degree of development, the intelligence station becomes capable to provide
the needed local logistics to carry out terrorist actions, once decided, as it happened in
Argentina, in many European countries and as it was about to occur again in the United
States.
The construction of intelligence stations abroad logically requires a wide
and deep knowledge of the distinctive characteristics of the location, as well as of the
particular idiosyncrasy of the society where it is going to be established. This is when
the locals become important as they know the cultural, political, economic and social
aspects of the society. Thus, the Muslim local communities and, within them, those with
a radical point of view, are the first recipients of the activities deployed by the Iranian
agents.
Also, the Prosecution Unit has referred to the common characteristics of
some Iranian people who mingled with the Muslim community in Buenos Aires,
stressing that they had arrived to the country since the mid-eighties; they were related to
the Iranian government; they studied only medicine; they drove taxis; they frequently
attended the Mosques in Cañuelas and/or Floresta, and some of them even were
accommodated there; they were connected with Iranian diplomatic officers, working as
translators at the Embassy and at its Cultural Attaché’s Office; they worked in the “front
companies”, shared homes and kept a closed relationship with Mohsen Rabbani.
The other special group capable of fulfilling important functions within
the intelligence station is the so called “sleeping cells”, which were characterized as
complementary tools to the embassies, in the Iranian infiltration plan.
25
According to Mesbahi, its mission “is very simple, to learn the language
and mingled into the society. They know that, when the moment comes, they will be
called as agents if necessary…”.
A clear example of a “sleeping cell”, which was settled for many years in
Germany and was used for a terrorist crime, is provided by the French judiciary when
referring to the murder of the Iranian dissident Reza Mazlouman: “Ahmad Jayhooni was
60 years old at the moment of the crime. (…) In 1981, for medical reasons, he
emigrated with his family, wife and three children, to Germany, to where he transferred
himself the sum of one million marks. Therefore, he was able to acquire a video library
in Bonn (…) Jayhooni, owner of a video library in Bonn, was a suspect for recording
videos of Iranian dissidents and of transmitting them to the Iranian intelligence
service”.
The “sleeping cells” are potentially very dangerous because they have the
capacity to provide, always following superior orders, different kinds of support to
terrorist elements that arrive to a country to perpetrate attacks.
This was discovered by European authorities in different cases. The
Director of Home Information Service of Berlin, of the former Federal Republic of
Germany, mentioned the discovery of an important Iranian group which had been
settled at the university to study. The remarkable fact is that these were chronic students
and young-adults who already had other studies. It has been determined that their true
role was to indoctrinate other Iranians by introducing them radical Shia ideology while
controlling them in case they were conspiring against Iran. He added that, in order to be
financially self-supported, they drove taxis, although most of them had scholarships and
were financed by official Iranian institutions.
Tri-border Area
The tragic event which took place in Buenos Aires in July 18th 1994 and
the plan to attack New York’s airport in 2007 -fortunately thwarted-, triggered official
26
investigations which enabled the gathering of abundant evidence. Those evidentiary
pieces allowed detecting that the Iranian Regime established clandestine intelligence
structures in, at least, two South American countries, which resources were used to
carry out terrorist actions. These same investigations revealed that the infiltration of the
Iranian Regime would not have been limited to Argentina and Guyana.
That verification made possible, an even imperative, to review several
facts that occurred in other South American countries and were closely connected with
those intelligence stations and the abovementioned terrorist activities. For example: the
suicidal bomber who died attacking the AMIA Center in Buenos Aires, entered
Argentina through the Triborder Area; Samuel Salman El Reda, head of the local
operative group, shared his activities between the Triborder Area, Colombia and
Argentina; Hadi Soleimanpour, Iranian Ambassador in Argentina at the time of the
bombing, was also the highest diplomatic representative of Iran in Paraguay; the
coordinator of the AMIA terrorist operation acted from Brazil with a telephone
attributed to André Marqués; Mohsen Rabbani also had activities in Uruguay, Chile and
Colombia, and so forth.-
Having said so, the indictment states that in the frontier of Brazil,
Paraguay and Argentina, known as the Triborder Area, it has been verified the
installation of many cultural and religious Islamic institutions (such as “Prophet
Mohammed” mosque in Ciudad del Este, the “Husseinia” mosque and the Benefic
Islamic Society in Foz de Iguazú), whose leaders were well-known members of
Hezbollah in the region, had close ties with Mohsen Rabbani and Samuel Salman El
Reda and were strongly related to Iran governmental departments.
This indictment reveals not only the existence of the above mentioned
institutions, but also the development of activities, legal and illegal, aimed to obtain
funding, documents and accommodation. It also discloses that, under the cover of legal
commercial fronts, banned mechanisms were articulated to finance Hezbollah, such as:
money laundering, smuggling, tax evasion and document’s forgery.
27
The strategic alliance between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah
is very tight in the ‘Triborder Area’. Moreover, it exceeded those boundaries reaching
other Brazilian cities such as Sao Paulo and Curitiba. A report from the Brazilian
Federal Police informs that radicalized Arabic Shias, members of the terrorist
organization Hezbollah and Sunnis related to Hamas, the Islamic Yihad and Gamat Al-
Islamiyah, were detected particularly in the Brazilian States of Sao Paulo, Parana and
the Federal District.
According to Interpol Brasilia, the Islamic Association of Brazil that used
to operate in Sao Paulo –and that shared its building with “Prophet Mohammed”
mosque- was a common meeting place for Hezbollah’s members.
In the diplomatic arena, the information indicates that Jaffar Saadat
Ahmad-Nia, Civil Attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Brasilia between 1991 and 1993,
would have worked as an Intelligence agent (VEVAK). About him, Mesbahi also stated
that during operative actions this person was “in situ”, from where he directed and
solved potential logistic problems. It is striking that he entered Argentina on March 16th,
1992 and left on March 18th, 1992, that is, the previous and the following day of the
Israeli Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires.
Regarding this matter, the Brazilian Regional Attorney, in charge of the
first region, Alexandre Camanho de Assis said: “Without being noticed by anyone, a
generation of Islamic extremists is emerging in Brazil”.
In the Republic of Paraguay, actions related to certain aspects of Iranian
intelligence bases were verified, such as the financing of terrorist organizations and the
presence of Hezbollah’s members, who had legal commercial activities only as a front
to conceal illegal ones.
There are hints that the previously mentioned operations are still active.
Charif Mahmoud Sayed, religious leader, entered Paraguayan soil on February 2012. He
is considered to be a member of Hezbollah’s Foreign Security apparatus and a close
28
collaborator of Ahmad Vahidi, Minister of Defense of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s
administration.
Uruguay, Chile and Colombia
It was corroborated that Mohsen Rabbani’s activities in Uruguay, Chile
and Colombia were very similar to those he developed in Argentina. This verification
makes sense since Rabbani was in charge of leading and coordinating the export of the
revolution in Latin America, which allowed him to play a vital role in the establishment
and development of Iranian Islamic centers in those countries.
Regarding his performance as regional chief in all Latin America, several
witnesses stated: “(…) regarding Mohsen Rabbani, he says that he was the highest
representative of the Shiites in South America (…)”; “(…) he knows that [Mohsen
Rabbani] was a cultural representative for Latin America (…)”; while the FBI
investigator Robert Addonizio testified that: “(…) Rabbani was the coordinator of the
Shiia movement for South America (…)”. This leadership position is confirmed also by
the former secretary at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires, who declared that:
“Rabbani had even more power than the Ambassador Soleimanpour”.-
For that reason, the Iranian presence in Chile, Uruguay and Colombia was
projected by Mohsen Rabbani’s figure, in correspondence with his high regional
position. Along with his disciples, he organized, developed, maintained Shia Muslim
communities in those countries, and indoctrinated them with the radical ideas of the
Iranian Islamic revolution.
Given Rabbani’s radical ideological profile and the goal he pursued when
he came to Argentina, it is feasible to infer that his ideas and the way to spread its
extremism in our country was also transmitted to the Islamic communities of
neighboring countries, following the common pattern designed by Iran for intelligence
infiltration and establishment of bases in Latin America.
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His activities were assisted by the Iranian diplomatic representations,
whose officers were, in many cases, identified as intelligence agents. One of the Regime
Ambassadors in Uruguay was Reza Hajd Zargabashi, who in 1993 was Ambassador in
Venezuela and main representative responsible for the Iranian officials that were
expelled from that country in July 1994, after trying to kidnap “at gunpoint” an Iranian
citizen who was tracked by the regime in order to forcibly send him back to Iran.
Another Iranian official that worked at the Embassy in Uruguay was Alí Amini, who
participated in the takeover of the US Embassy in Teheran in 1979 as spokesman of the
revolutionary group that kept 55 people captive during 444 days.
Also, Mohammad Mehdi Pourmohammadi, accredited as Iranian
Ambassador in Uruguay in August 11th, 1987, had criminal records on arms trafficking
and was implicated in terrorist activities. The following Ambassador in Uruguay was
Mohammad Ali Sarmadi-Rad, was also identified as an Intelligence official. The First
Secretary, Ahmad Abousaedi, accredited in Uruguay from April 1st, 1991 to January
23rd, 1995, was identified by witness Mesbahi as a member of the Revolutionary Guards
Corps in charge of the local planning in every future attack. Therefore, it is more than
suggestive to know for a fact that Abousaedi entered Argentina on June 18th 1994,
exactly one month before the AMIA bombing.
Please note that all the above mentioned officials had backgrounds that
turn them useful for those parallel activities related to the export of the Revolution. It is
evident that the combination of so many people with military and intelligence
backgrounds, acting as Iranian foreign officials, cannot be deem a coincidence. On the
contrary, the appointment of these people has been the result of a careful selection
aimed to further the final objective.
There was a similar situation regarding the Iranian diplomats accredited in
Chile. Hamid Reza Hosseini, Iranian Ambassador in that country, was involved in the
takeover of the US Embassy in Teheran in 1979. He was expelled from New York while
being part of the Iranian mission before the United Nations, for his participation in
intelligence activities. Seyed Yousef Arabi, who was appointed Consular Affairs
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Attaché at the Iranian Embassy in Chile from June 9th, 1992 to November 22nd, 1995,
was identified as head of the intelligence station and member of VEVAK.
In Colombia, Samuel Salman El Reda, head of the local operative group in
the AMIA bombing, benefited from his forged Colombian citizenship to conceal his
Lebanese origin and travel with frequency along the continent without raising any
suspicion.
Moreover, the words of former Colombian Intelligence Director, Fernando
Tabares, should be highlighted in this brief. On December 3rd, 2010 he informed the
Colombian Supreme Court of Justice that the national security agencies conducted an
investigation which concluded that resources were sent from Maicao -one of the places
of residence of Samuel Salman El Reda– to Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. There were
structures in Maicao that enabled the inflow of those terrorists, who were provided with
Colombian identity documents so that they could travel to other countries in South
America. He added that Iran reactivated his Embassy there and that most of the officials
that were accrediting themselves were Intelligence Iranian agents, “MOIS people, very
well trained and prepared”. Tabares stated that there were Islamic groups in Colombia
that sent people to receive training in Qom, Iran, adding that the Muslim regime trained
them in terrorism and then sent them back converted to Islam.
Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago and Surinam
In the same way that Rabbani projected his influence in several South
American countries, Kadir did so in Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Barbados,
Antigua and Barbuda, Surinam and Grenada. His activity as an Iranian leader allowed
him to establish and strengthen relations with other regional Islamic leaders and by
1998 he was the representative of the Secretariat of the Caribbean Islamic Movement.
The evolution of the propaganda activities can be observed in the
documentation seized during the searches conducted in Kadir’s residence and,
according to those documents, from 1982 to 1991 took place the initial and expansive
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phase for most of the new Shia brothers/sisters in the region. To materialize this cause,
Abdul Kadir and his wife Isha traveled every week to Georgetown to teach the new
converts. They focused their efforts on recruiting in Linden and Guyana as a whole.
They also traveled to Trinidad and even reached Dominica, Barbados, Antigua and
Grenada. Their main goal was to introduce the Shia thought locally and throughout the
Caribbean.-
Kadir’s closest collaborators, such as Latif Ali (also located in Guyana and
President of the “Pioneer Shia [Muslim] Association of Guyana”) and Ismail
Muhammad (based in Surinam, leader of a Shia mosque in Paramaribo, with a post
office box under the name “Hezbollah Surinam”), contributed from their locations to the
export of the revolution in the Caribbean.
The content of one of Latif Ali’s letters to Kadir has turned out to be
revealing: “I got a call from Iran asking me to be available. In other words, they said to
me to stay at home. This should not be relayed to the three musketeers…please
remember the IRI call is between me and you. I will keep you informed…”
Special attention should be paid to Sheik Kareem Ibrahiim of Trinidad and
Tobago, with close ties with the expansionist Iranian program and sentenced to life
imprisonment along with Abdul Kadir for conspiring to blow the John F Kennedy
Airport of New York. He was directly connected to the Iranian Regime, which provided
him with financial support and also was related to Yasin Abu Bakr, founder and leader
of the terrorist Trinidadian group Jamaat al Muslim (JAM). Furthermore and according
to Steven Francis’s testimony, Ibrahiim received visits from Iranian citizens in Trinidad
and his contacts in Iran were going to provide the economic support and the religious
authorization –the fatwa- to execute the attack to New York’s airport.
